Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions by Hylton, Keith
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and 
Changing Economic Conditions 
Keith Hylton 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Keith Hylton, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions, 
77 Antitrust Law Journal 247 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/508 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194





The recent financial crisis and ensuing recession have touched off a
round of introspection on antitrust policy. Federal antitrust enforce-
ment officials referred to the crisis as a justification for a more aggres-
sive stance, and suggested that the crisis and current recession are due
in part to lax enforcement in previous administrations.1 The financial
sector itself has become more concentrated as a result of the crisis, as
regulators have pushed and approved mergers in order to rescue dis-
tressed banks.2 The rising unemployment rate, now standing just under
10 percent, provides another perspective on the argument for rethink-
ing antitrust priorities.3
* The authors are, respectively, The Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law, Boston
University, School of Law, and Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Pol-
icy, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business. For helpful comments we thank Paul
Edelman, Luke Froeb, and workshop participants at Vanderbilt Law School. We are grate-
ful to Marina Lao for organizing this symposium and providing comments to contribu-
tors, and to Su Sun and other editors of the Antitrust Law Journal for many helpful
suggestions.
1 This view was presented in a speech announcing the antitrust policies of the current
administration. For the text of the speech, see Christine A. Varney, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era
(May 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm.
2 See, e.g., Ian Guider & Louisa Fahy, Roubini Says Bank Mergers May Create “Bigger Mon-
ster,” BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206010
87&sid=ae.OQGynRAX4&pos=4; Andrea Gomes da Silva & Mark Sansom, Antitrust Impli-
cations of the Financial Crisis: A UK and EU View, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 24.
3 Specifically, the rising unemployment rate introduces a wealth distribution perspec-
tive, which has generally not been a major feature of antitrust policy. The traditional
economic argument against monopolies is that they reduce social welfare by supplying
fewer goods and services than would be observed in competitive markets. See, e.g., RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 13–14 (2d ed. 2001). The distributional effect of monopo-
lization has not been stressed in the economic literature. For an exception, see Robert H.
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The questions to be addressed in any major rethink of antitrust policy
are obvious. Should enforcement be extended in new directions?
Should courts reconsider the tradeoff between false convictions and
false acquittals reflected in existing law? Should the crisis be viewed as a
justification for a temporary change in antitrust policy, or an opportu-
nity to reconsider policy for all seasons?
Given the potentially infinite number of questions, we will not at-
tempt a broad survey of the crisis’s implications for antitrust policy.
There are too many issues, and their implications too varied. Instead we
will start with a narrow focus on enforcement principles and branch out
to an examination of their implications for antitrust policy.
We will take this as an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus
static cost tradeoff in antitrust policy4 and its implications for varying
enforcement with economic conditions. The dynamic versus static cost
tradeoff is at the foundation of policy questions in antitrust, especially in
monopolization law. But modern policy debates have given surprisingly
little attention to the dynamic efficiency problem in antitrust—that is,
the problem of designing antitrust law to encourage, or at least to avoid
discouraging, incentives to invest in the creation and expansion of mar-
kets. Of course, this has always been recognized as a legitimate concern,5
but it has also been waved off as a question too complicated and ambig-
uous to play a serious role in antitrust policy. As a result, dynamic incen-
tives are mentioned, if at all, as an afterthought in most discussions of
antitrust policy.
This is a deep and longstanding issue in antitrust theory. The Chicago
School revolution took static efficiency from being a marginal concern
and afterthought to a central issue in antitrust analysis. The same sort of
intellectual revolution has yet to happen with respect to dynamic effi-
ciency.6 Our goal is to advance the case a bit further for incorporating
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpre-
tation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
4 David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power
and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2008, at
203; J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 581, 584 (2009); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, “Schumpeterian”
Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, COMPETITION, Fall/Winter 2005, at 47
(2005); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust
Applications (B.U. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-33, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1305147.
5 The dynamic efficiency concern is typically attributed to Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1975).
6 Sidak & Teece, supra note 4, at 584.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616194
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dynamic efficiency in antitrust analysis. Along the way we will study the
lessons for examining antitrust policy in poor economic conditions.
The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here implies that anti-
trust enforcers should put a greater weight on the dynamic cost of en-
forcement during recessions. On the theory that a crisis opens the door
to reassessing everything,7 we examine implications for antitrust policy
in all conditions as well. We argue below that taking dynamic efficiency
into account leads to a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine and to a
better understanding of the tradeoff between false conviction and false
acquittal costs in monopolization and merger cases.
I. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The economic principles of antitrust enforcement widely accepted to-
day are largely those emphasized in the Chicago School approach to
antitrust8 and formalized in Gary Becker’s examination of optimal law
enforcement.9 In Figure 1, we present a diagram that illustrates the key
policy concerns in the antitrust setting.10 For simplicity, we will assume
that the entity of concern is a monopolizing firm, though the analysis
that follows could also be applied to a cartel.
A. STATIC ENFORCEMENT MODEL
The firm has a choice whether to take a “monopolizing act.” The act
could be a decision to enter into an exclusivity contract or to tie one
product to another. The monopolizing act allows the firm to increase its
price, leading to a transfer (T in Figure 1) of consumer surplus to the
firm. The price increase also leads to a reduction in output below the
competitive level and associated loss in consumer welfare (D), which we
will also refer to below as “destroyed surplus” or as “deadweight loss.”
7 Rahm Emanuel’s comment that “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste,” has
become perhaps the most memorable quote of the Great Recession. For the quote and its
context, see Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at
A2. This article reflects the spirit of opportunism reflected in Emanuel’s remark. Crises
invite specific short-term solutions, but they also invite total reassessments of past
practices.
8 For the original presentation of the Chicago School point of view, see Aaron Director
& Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956). See
also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
9 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
10 For a discussion of the implications of the economics of enforcement for antitrust,
see William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652
(1983). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28
(1989).
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After the monopolizing act, consumers are left with the residual surplus
(W in the diagram).
The firm’s monopolizing act may have efficiency consequences. For
example, an exclusive dealing contract with a key input supplier could
have a monopolizing effect by excluding rival firms from access to the
supplier, but it could also enhance efficiency by reducing supply costs.
The efficiency gain is shown in Figure 1 by E. The diagram assumes that
the efficiency gain appears in the form of reduction of average cost from
c0 to c1. The new cost curve c1 is shown with a dotted line because we are
assuming that the efficiency gain is a random event that may or may not
materialize.
The Chicago School is given credit for having made efficiency a cen-
tral concern of antitrust analysis. Its most important lesson is that be-
cause of the potential efficiencies associated with many acts that might
have a monopolizing effect, society should not set out to prohibit such
acts. To do so might reduce society’s wealth, both in the short run and
in the long run. Specifically, the firm’s monopolizing act may generate
gains (to firm owners and consumers) that exceed the short-run con-
sumer harm caused by supracompetitive pricing. In Figure 1, the effi-
ciency gain E could be greater than the deadweight loss D. If the
efficiency gain is greater than the deadweight loss, then the firm’s
monopolizing act would enhance social welfare, which is the sum of wel-
fare going to consumers and to producers.
The distribution of the wealth generated by the market is not taken
into account in this argument. An efficiency gain in the form of a cost
reduction is a benefit to the owners of the monopolizing firm, and not
to consumers, at least in the short run. An approach to antitrust that
equates social welfare exclusively with short-run consumer welfare would
hold that an act that reduces consumer welfare should be condemned,
even if it leads to a greater gain in producer welfare. We will not enter
this debate.11 We will assume, consistent with the Chicago School ap-
proach, that total welfare is the appropriate objective function for
antitrust.
Given that the goal of antitrust enforcement should not be to prohibit,
or completely deter, all monopolizing acts, what is the appropriate goal?
The alternative to prohibition is a policy of internalizing to the mono-
11 On the debate, see Lande, supra note 3; Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Eco-
nomics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2006, at 3; Ken
Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L,
Autumn 2006, at 29; Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Anti-
trust Enforcement, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at 205.
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FIGURE 1: WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF MONOPOLIZING ACT
THAT ALSO REDUCES COSTS
polizing firm the social costs of its conduct.12 Under the internalization
approach, the firm would choose to take a monopolizing act when and
only when the gain to the firm exceeds the loss to consumers. Efficient
conduct would not be prohibited. The internalization rule generates a
simple recommendation for the optimal monetary penalty: if enforce-
12 Becker, supra note 9. Internalization results in “first-best” deterrence—in the sense
that the monopolization decision will be made when and only when it increases social
welfare. We are equating first-best deterrence with optimal deterrence, but the two can be
distinguished in some settings. For example, if enforcement agents have discretion over
whether to bring an action in court or in an administrative proceeding, an optimal en-
forcement regime might discourage costly types of litigation or weak claims. For a discus-
sion of the difference between first-best and optimal deterrence in the private
enforcement (litigation) setting, see Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Dam-
ages be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON & ORG. 388, 410 (2005).
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ment is perfect and costless, the penalty should be set equal to the sum
of the transfer from consumers and the forgone consumer surplus
(deadweight loss). Referring to Figure 1, the optimal punishment
scheme will require the imposition of a fine equal to T+D on the mono-
polizing firm. Faced with such a fine, the firm will take the monopoliz-
ing act only when its gain is greater than the consumer harm.
If the enforcement authority is unlikely to detect and bring an en-
forcement action in every instance of a monopolizing act, the optimal
penalty will include a multiplier. This is based on the simple principle
that if a bad actor gets away with offenses half of the time, his punish-
ment will have to be doubled in the times that he is caught in order to
preserve a given level of deterrence. In addition, if enforcement is
costly, the enforcement cost should be internalized to the monopolizing
firm, since enforcement is a natural byproduct of its conduct.13 If the
probability of enforcement is P, and the enforcement cost is C, the opti-
mal antitrust penalty is then14
T + DStatic Penalty = +C.
P
We refer to this as the optimal static penalty because our description of
the enforcement problem does not incorporate any consideration of the
long-term incentive effects of antitrust enforcement.
Another variation on the optimal static penalty is the case of a firm
that takes a monopolizing act that also enhances the quality of the firm’s
product. For example, the firm could introduce a new product that sets
an industry standard that has an exclusionary effect on rivals.15 The
firm’s act reduces consumer surplus by leading to a surplus transfer and
the imposition of deadweight loss. However, it also increases surplus by
enhancing the value of the firm’s product, or all products that meet the
new standard. In this case, the optimal punishment scheme will reduce
13 The assumption that enforcement is a natural byproduct of an offense simplifies mat-
ters, but it not necessarily valid. Suppose the enforcement agency decides each case by
comparing the gain from enforcement to its cost. In this case, an optimal scheme might
shift the enforcement cost to the agency in order to generate efficient enforcement
decisions.
14 See Landes, supra note 10; KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 43–52 (2003) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW].
15 See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 345–46 (2006).
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the fine by the amount of the new surplus generated by the product’s
enhancement.16
The static model just considered has been criticized for its softening
effect on antitrust enforcement.17 When efficiency is incorporated into
the analysis, the arguments for limiting the size of penalties and for dis-
cretionary enforcement become stronger, especially in the area of mo-
nopolization. Many of the acts that have been held anticompetitive in
the monopolization case law involve conduct that might introduce effi-
ciencies or might be efficiency based. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,18 Judge Learned Hand found Alcoa in violation of Section 2
because it preemptively expanded capacity,19 occupying new markets
before rivals had a chance to gain a significant presence. But the expan-
sion of capacity in anticipation of new markets is conduct that many
business managers would view as concrete evidence of intelligent fore-
sight. Anticipatory capacity expansion may exclude rivals by deterring
entry, but it may also be necessary to efficiently meet consumer needs.
The role of the enforcement probability also has implications for the
quality of antitrust enforcement. Price fixing is difficult to detect, as par-
ticipants try to hide their agreements from the public. Monopolization,
however, generally is not difficult to detect. The most common mono-
polizing acts (e.g., exclusive dealing, tying, mergers, cutting price below
cost)20 are carried out in broad daylight and even trumpeted to the pub-
lic. Even when the monopolizing efforts are concealed, the eventual re-
sult if successful is obvious to everyone and will invite a challenge from
its victims. The optimal enforcement model suggests that a trebling of
damages is probably too small a multiplier for collusion cases, and prob-
ably excessive for the typical monopolization case. Since the probability
of detection and enforcement are high in the monopolization setting,
the case for multiplying monopolization damages as a general rule is
unclear.
To be sure, not every case of monopolization will lead to an enforce-
ment action. Monopolizing acts may be observed and best understood
16 For a discussion of this point in the context of optimal enforcement in the patent-
antitrust setting, see Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and
Reverse Settlements, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 181 (2010).
17 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 10.
18 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Id. at 431.
20 We do not mean to suggest these acts serve only a monopolizing purpose—of course,
they are often normal, competitive business practices. This short list of practices is based
on the types of conduct repeatedly challenged in antitrust litigation.
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by rival firms and contracting parties.21 These may be constrained from
petitioning enforcement agencies or bringing lawsuits in several ways.
Complaining to an enforcement agency or bringing a lawsuit may dam-
age long-term business relationships. Alternatively, the cost of litigation
or even of participating as a third party in government enforcement ac-
tion, in terms of financial and managerial resources, may be too high in
light of the private return. These are all possible constraints that might
reduce the likelihood of enforcement in the monopolization area.
This model is for the most part suggestive because it treats enforce-
ment as an exclusively public sector activity. This is also true of Becker’s
analysis of the economics of law enforcement. When private actions are
modeled carefully, one finds a close link between the probability of a
private action and the profitability of a lawsuit.22 If the multiplier is set at
a level that induces all victims to bring suit, the probability of an en-
forcement action will be 100 percent. But once the probability of a pri-
vate enforcement action reaches 100 percent, there will no longer be a
need to multiply damages. It follows that the optimal multiplier for pri-
vate lawsuits efficiently balances the supply of lawsuits with the “de-
mand” required by the optimal deterrence goal.23
In a more detailed or disaggregated model the probability of enforce-
ment would be broken down into the product of three components: the
probability of detection, the probability of an enforcement action, and
the probability of liability. The simple model discussed here assumes
that these are all assessed on the assumption that a violation has oc-
curred. Courts are assumed to be perfectly accurate and baseless or friv-
olous enforcement actions are not incorporated. If baseless or frivolous
actions are incorporated, along with the assumption of judicial error, it
may not be desirable on optimal deterrence grounds to determine the
penalty by multiplying the total consumer harm by the reciprocal of the
probability of enforcement.24
B. DYNAMIC ENFORCEMENT MODEL
Although controversial for its enforcement implications, the Chicago
School antitrust policy fails to incorporate dynamic considerations. By
dynamic, we refer to the effects of enforcement on incentives in previ-
21 Joe Brodley made this point in the context of his assessment of merger disputes. See
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and
Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996).
22 Hylton & Miceli, supra note 12, at 410.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 14, at 66–67.
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ous time periods to invest in activities. Return to the simple model
shown in Figure 1. Suppose there are two time periods. In the first, the
firm decides whether to invest in an activity that generates the market.
In the second, the firm decides whether to take the monopolizing act.
Suppose the firm designs and produces a new, superior type of artifi-
cial tooth in the first period.25 Suppose also that the firm cannot get a
patent on the design and that the tooth is easily replicable. Facing the
risk of immediate competition from firms that copy its design, the firm
may decide to take an action that excludes rivals for some period of
time. Suppose, for example, the firm enters into exclusivity contracts
with the most important downstream sellers of dental products. The ex-
clusivity contracts will not exclude competition forever, nor for a period
as long as a patent, but the contracts will exclude competition long
enough for the innovating firm to earn a supracompetitive return on its
investment in the artificial tooth design.
In this dynamic story, what happens to consumers when the firm cre-
ates the market and then takes an act that excludes competition? As in
the static story, some surplus is transferred to the firm (T ) and some
surplus is destroyed (D). However, unlike the static story, the firm’s con-
duct has also rewarded consumers with the residual consumer surplus
that remains after the monopolizing conduct (W ). If not for the firm’s
first-period investment, which was undertaken because of anticipation of
profits generated from second-period exclusionary conduct, consumers
never would have received the residual surplus.
The optimal antitrust penalty has to be designed to reconcile conflict-
ing welfare concerns. There is the static welfare concern addressed ear-
lier: the monopolizing firm should be forced to regurgitate the transfer
and to pay for the destroyed surplus D in order to optimally regulate (in
the first-best sense) its incentive to monopolize. However, the penalty
will also affect ex ante investment incentives. In order to optimally regu-
late investment incentives, the ideal penalty would be negative; it is a
subsidy equal to the residual surplus. This is because the private benefit
of the firm’s investment is simply the transfer (T ). The social benefit of
its investment is the sum of the transfer and residual surplus (T+W ). In
order to align private incentives to invest with social incentives, the pun-
ishment authority should award the monopolizing firm with a bounty
equal to the residual surplus. These conflicting welfare concerns are not
easy to reconcile.
25 This example, based partially on United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d
181 (3d Cir. 2005), is taken from Evans & Hylton, supra note 4.
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We assume that the monopolizing firm cannot engage in price dis-
crimination. If the firm implements perfect price discrimination in the
monopolization stage, charging each consumer the maximum that he is
willing to pay, there will be no economic basis for imposing a penalty, or
for providing a subsidy. The perfectly discriminating monopolist will not
destroy any surplus; and, given this, there will be no need to impose the
static penalty in order to regulate the monopolization incentive. And
since the perfectly discriminating monopolist will not externalize any
surplus that it generates from innovation to consumers, there will be no
need to provide a subsidy in order to optimally regulate the investment
incentive. An alternative scenario to consider is where the firm can dis-
criminate only enough to capture the residual surplus. In this case the
optimal dynamic penalty will be the same as the static penalty. It will still
be socially desirable in this case to regulate the monopolization incen-
tive, but not the investment decision.
In our study of the dynamic enforcement model,26 we found that the
optimal penalty is a weighted average of the static penalty and a subsidy
based on the residual surplus. Specifically, the optimal antitrust penalty
in the dynamic setting is of the form
T + D −WDynamic Penalty = (1− q) ( ) + q ( ) + C ,P P
where the weighting parameter q, itself an increasing function of the
penalty, varies with the relative responsiveness of the firm’s monopoliza-
tion and investment incentives to changes in the penalty. If a change in
the penalty would have no effect on ex ante investment, while discourag-
ing the monopolizing act, q will be close to zero, and the dynamic pen-
alty will be roughly the same as the static penalty. This might be
observed if the firm’s discount rate is so high that a change in the pen-
alty has little effect on ex ante investment incentives. If the change in
the penalty has a big impact on ex ante investment, the optimal penalty
probably will be negative—specifically, a subsidy based on the residual
consumer surplus.
The sign and size of the optimal antitrust penalty depend on several
factors. If the expected enforcement cost is greater than the residual
surplus (PC > W ), then the optimal dynamic penalty is always positive.27
This is unlikely to be observed in general. It would be an enormously
inefficient administrative process that resulted in enforcement costs that
always exceeded the residual surplus generated by a new product. Alter-
26 Hylton & Lin, supra note 4.
27 Id. at Appendix, Case 1.
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natively, the case in which the expected enforcement cost exceeds the
residual surplus can be viewed as encompassing the instances in which
the residual surplus from innovation is trivial, another scenario that
should be regarded as a special case.
If the expected enforcement cost is less than the residual surplus (PC
< W ), the optimal dynamic penalty could be a penalty or a subsidy de-
pending on the parameters. If the residual surplus is sufficiently large
relative to the consumer harm, the optimal penalty is always a subsidy
equal to the residual surplus divided by the enforcement probability less
the enforcement cost (W/P – C).28 When the residual surplus is below
that level, the optimal penalty could be either a positive weighted aver-
age of the static penalty and the residual-surplus subsidy (as in the
formula above), or just the residual-surplus subsidy.
We present the results of a model simulation in Figure 2. The simula-
tion assumes the parameter values are such that the optimal dynamic
penalty is positive—i.e., it is not a subsidy.29 The probability of enforce-
ment is assumed to be less than 1, specifically 0.7; the cost of enforce-
ment is set at 2, which is the minimum value for the static penalty.30
Even in this case, the dynamic penalty is substantially less than the static
penalty and the implicit multiplier on consumer harm is less than 1.
Unlike the static penalty, the dynamic penalty converges toward a fixed
amount as the total consumer harm grows. The ceiling on the dynamic
penalty represents the limit at which investment is excessively discour-
aged by any further penalty increase.
II. IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the model summarized in the previous part is to in-
corporate dynamic efficiency considerations directly into the economic
analysis of antitrust enforcement. This is in contrast to the traditional
approach, which relies on a static analysis and then adds dynamic effi-
ciency considerations on at the end as footnotes, afterthoughts, and
qualifications. Incorporating the dynamic efficiency issue at the outset
forces the analyst to design and evaluate basic features of antitrust en-
forcement policy with dynamic cost considerations in mind.
28 Id. at Appendix, Case 2.
29 This biases our simulation in the direction of larger (dynamic) penalties. If we ex-
amined a wider array of parameter values, the divergence between the optimal static and
dynamic penalties would be greater than observed in Figure 2.
30 Recall that the static penalty is the sum of two terms: (1) the consumer harm divided
by the enforcement probability and (2) the enforcement cost. Thus, for a given enforce-
ment probability, as the consumer harm approaches zero, the optimal static penalty ap-
proaches the enforcement cost.
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FIGURE 2: SIMULATION OF OPTIMAL PENALTY IN DYNAMIC
AND STATIC ENFORCEMENT MODELS
The dynamic enforcement model has implications for antitrust policy.
We will first discuss the implications for the interpretation and reform
of existing law, and then consider implications for changing economic
conditions.
A. THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF PROFITS
The investment that we refer to in the model above could take the
form of any decision to sink resources into an activity that creates or
expands a market. The typical example is the development of a new
product. But there is no reason to limit the application of this model to
the creation of new products. Any investment that enhances the value of
a product or service within an existing market could also fit within the
model.31 If the new source of value that is created by costly investment is
31 Admittedly, this is a partial equilibrium analysis. Suppose we examined a model with
two markets. An innovation in one might reduce demand in the other market, destroying
surplus in the other market. Still, if consumers leave one market (the static one) to enter
the innovating market, they presumably would do so only if there was a net increase in
surplus for each one of them. Total surplus should therefore rise following innovation.
There may be a special case in which net surplus falls, but that is likely to be a peculiar
case.
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easily replicable by rivals, the firm that invests initially will have an incen-
tive to limit follow-on competition in order to secure a normal return on
the investment.
Within this model, profit, rather than being a direct transfer from
consumer welfare as in the static economic model, serves a regulatory
function. Profit is the reward for market-creating and market-expanding
investment, and the expectation of profit is the signal that generates
such investment.
In the standard economic analysis of the market, profit serves as a
signal for entry and exit. This is a socially productive role, but its value is
diminished in antitrust analysis by the assumption that entry is blocked
by the action of the monopolizing firm. With profit unable to serve as a
signal that actually induces entry, the conclusion follows in the standard
antitrust treatment that any profit existing beyond the short run serves
no socially desirable purpose beyond the provision of a normal return
on existing resources devoted to production and selling.
When profit is recognized to serve the socially productive role of en-
couraging investment that creates or expands markets, the argument for
eliminating all opportunities for firms to charge a price that exceeds
average avoidable cost is no longer as persuasive as in the static frame-
work. Of course, this does not lead to the conclusion that all efforts to
exclude rivals should be treated as per se lawful under the antitrust laws.
However, the dynamic model suggests that practices that might enable a
firm to exclude rivals, such as tying and exclusive dealing, should not be
regarded as presumptively socially undesirable even when there is no
offsetting static efficiency, such as a reduction in selling costs.
Indeed, in the special scenario where the entire anticipated profit
from exclusion is necessary to induce the firm to invest in innovation ex
ante, the static costs from exclusionary conduct are largely illusionary.
The forgone surplus from supracompetitive pricing would never have
been enjoyed by consumers if the firm did not invest in the initial time
period.32 Consumers suffer no costs from exclusion. They gain to the
extent of the residual surplus.
32 This has implications for the importance of the welfare standard used to assess an-
ticompetitive conduct; specifically, the total harm versus consumer harm debate. We
noted earlier that our optimal enforcement prescriptions are based on a total welfare
objective. But even if we adopted (short-run) consumer welfare as the appropriate maxi-
mand, there would still be some constraint on the total fine that would be optimal to
impose on an antitrust violator. The implications of our enforcement model for antitrust
analysis may be weakened to some degree but they do not become irrelevant once the
objective function is switched from total welfare to consumer welfare.
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B. UNDERSTANDING SECTION 2 DOCTRINE
One longstanding paradox of Section 2 doctrine was at the core of
Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Alcoa. Hand noted that cartels are per
se illegal and then argued that a monopoly is equivalent in effect to a
cartel.33 From this analogy it followed that the exercise of monopoly
power should be treated as an offense under the Sherman Act.34 The
paradox created by the law is that the mere exercise or exploitation of
monopoly power is perfectly legal under American law. What explains
this paradox?
Evans and Hylton argue that the safe harbor created in American law
for monopoly exploitation reflects the recognition by courts that Sec-
tion 2 should not be enforced so broadly as to discourage innovation—
innovation understood capaciously to encompass the creation of new
markets and expansion of existing ones.35 Under this view of the law, the
paradox described by Judge Hand is not a paradox at all. The courts are
unable to fashion precise case-specific penalties of the sort envisioned in
the optimal enforcement model. If the courts were able to do so, they
would award subsidies in some antitrust cases involving innovation ante-
cedent to monopolization. But given the inability (or, more precisely,
lack of technical capacity) of courts to design optimal case-specific pen-
alties, they have shaped antitrust doctrine in a way that effectively shields
firms from antitrust liability in a substantial set of the instances in which
innovation is antecedent to monopolization. The law prohibits a narrow
set of monopolizing acts, while leaving firms a great deal of room to
adopt competitive strategies—whether advertising, product differentia-
tion, protection of trade secrets, acquisition of patents, packaging, pric-
ing, allocation of supply—that have the effect of excluding rivals.36
Indeed, although the scope of monopolization law has appeared to wax
and wane over various time periods,37 the most expansive theories of
exclusionary conduct, associated with the school of industrial organiza-
tion scholarship initiated by Joe Bain,38 have never gained a serious foot-
hold in American monopolization law.
33 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427–28 (2d Cir. 1945).
34 Id. at 428.
35 Evans & Hylton, supra note 4.
36 Id. at 211–12.
37 See, e.g., HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 14, at 186–229.
38 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956).
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The static enforcement model is incapable of providing a positive the-
ory of this basic feature of monopolization law.39 Under the static en-
forcement model, firms that exploit monopoly power gained through
luck should be penalized to the same degree as those that exploit mo-
nopoly power gained through exclusionary conduct.40
To say that the dynamic enforcement model provides a positive the-
ory for the exploitation safe harbor in existing Section 2 case law is not
to say that the law is optimal in its current state. The safe harbor is sur-
rounded by soft edges rather than a hard shell, and the current trend in
the enforcement agencies is to press in at the edges of the shell. More-
over, there is no way to tell on a priori grounds whether it would be
optimal to broaden the scope of the safe harbor. The approach we take
to policy is to suggest that cases involving innovation, considered
broadly, would be ideal candidates to be swept into the safe harbors of
Section 2 case law.
C. DAMAGES
The dynamic enforcement model suggests that treble damages for
Section 2 violations may be socially undesirable. The static enforcement
model, as we noted, probably implies this already. Given that mono-
polizing conduct is seldom conducted in secrecy,41 the probability of de-
tection and enforcement is likely to be high in most serious cases of
exclusionary conduct. Even within the static enforcement model, the ar-
gument for applying a multiplier to penalties based on consumer harm
would not be uncontestable in monopolization cases. If, as seems plausi-
ble, the joint detection and enforcement probability is high in monopo-
39 Evans & Hylton, supra note 4, at 220–24. The exclusion versus exploitation distinc-
tion appears to be an international norm. Although EU antitrust law formally prohibits
monopoly exploitation, in practice the European competition authorities seldom bring
prosecutions against cases of exploitation. Id. at 221–24.
40 Obviously, one could argue that the law is indifferent to exploitation and is really
concerned only with exclusion. But this leads to the question, why bother? Why should
the law punish exclusion when it is not followed by exploitation? In actual practice, every
monopolization case involves a claim of exploitation. Courts justify punishment on the
ground that exploitation hurts consumers and destroys surplus, even when it merely
transfers wealth between firms.
41 Of course, there are counterexamples. A firm might obtain a patent on fraudulent
grounds. In this case, one might say that the monopolizing act (the acquisition of the
patent) was carried out in secrecy. But even in this example, the final result of the pat-
ent—the monopoly—and its immediate cause (the patent) are both open and obvious to
everyone. If the patent monopoly is substantial, rival firms would have incentives to chal-
lenge it. Those firms would have incentives to invest resources into discovering the fraud,
or at least challenging the monopoly. In general, almost every example of monopoliza-
tion involves conduct that is open and obvious in its effect, and in this sense is different
from the collusion case. We thank Maurice Stucke for suggesting this counterexample.
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lization cases, the optimal static penalty is roughly equal to the sum of
the transfer and deadweight loss. If the treble damages remedy is
roughly three times the transfer, then the treble damages remedy proba-
bly will be greater than the optimal static penalty.
Of course, this argument assumes that detection is the key factor caus-
ing variability in the probability of private enforcement efforts. If detec-
tion is not the key factor, and instead it is weak incentives for private
enforcement actions, then the argument for a damages multiplier in
monopolization cases becomes stronger. But this raises the question why
private enforcement incentives would be weak, especially when rivals
(excluded firms) can easily complain to competition authorities or sue
under a statutory framework that provides attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.
The dynamic model adds another reason to question the general de-
sirability of trebling in Section 2 cases. In the innovation antecedent to
monopolization scenario, there are two levels for the optimal dynamic
penalty: a pure subsidy equal to the residual surplus multiplied by the
reciprocal of the enforcement probability, and a weighted average of
the static penalty and the residual surplus subsidy (both multiplied by
the reciprocal of the enforcement probability). No matter which form is
correct for a particular case, the optimal dynamic penalty is less than the
optimal static penalty. If the probability of enforcement is high in mo-
nopolization cases, then the optimal dynamic penalty, because it is less
than the static penalty, will also be less than the treble damages
measure.
It should be clear that this is a default approach we are suggesting.
The model incorporates the probability of enforcement as a parameter
that can take different values. If the probability of enforcement for some
particular set of monopolization law violations is unambiguously low,
then the enforcement model could generate a corresponding dynamic
fine that is greater than the treble damages measure. But this is not
necessarily so. Unlike the static enforcement setting, the dynamic pen-
alty may actually decline as the probability of enforcement falls.42 And
42 See Hylton & Lin, supra note 4. First, the optimal responses of the dynamic penalty to
changes in key parameters are more complicated than in the static model. A small reduc-
tion in the probability of enforcement could increase the optimal dynamic penalty, the
opposite of the static enforcement model. The reason is that a small reduction in the
enforcement probability alters the sensitivity of investment to the penalty. This imparts a
type of “substitution effect” (in contrast to the “scale effect” of diluting enforcement),
which may result (paradoxically) in a reduction in the optimal penalty level. For large
changes in the probability of enforcement, the results are also more complicated. For
example, as the enforcement probability goes to zero, the model’s recommendation shifts
from the scenario in which a positive penalty is optimal to that in which a negative penalty
(the subsidy) may be optimal. The reason is that as the enforcement probability falls, the
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there are additional complications that could be brought into the
model that would limit the optimal size of any multiplier based on the
probability of enforcement.43 The most important complication of this
sort is the possibility of false convictions and the existence of claims
(baseless or frivolous) that take advantage of such errors.
D. EXPANDED SAFE HARBORS AND NO-FLY ZONES
Of course, the courts do not attempt to calculate optimal case-specific
penalties and subsidies, as envisioned in the model. Instead of subsidies,
the general approach of courts is to create porous exemptions or safe
harbors in the case law. The most important safe harbor is that for mere
exploitation of monopoly power. The exploitation safe harbor can be
viewed as a rough approximation of the dynamic enforcement model’s
implications. Firms are not penalized for merely charging the monopoly
price, but then they are not given subsidies for instances in which the
residual surplus from their market investments is large relative to the
consumer harm resulting from exploitation.
The optimal enforcement model provides a guideline for safe harbors
and interpretation rules that move the law toward exempting, on dy-
namic efficiency grounds, some instances of alleged monopolization.
For example, the model provides a justification for the decision in
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,44 where the court applied the rule
of reason to Jerrold’s tying policy during the period in which the policy
was thought to be necessary for the successful launch of its product (tel-
evision antennae systems) in an uncertain market environment. The re-
sult is equivalent to a safe harbor; the rule of reason applied to tying
permits a court to take efficiencies into account, which often results in a
finding of legality.
A broader application of the model is possible to market power issues.
In order to find a firm guilty of monopolization, a court must first deter-
mine that the firm has market power. Market power is understood as the
ability to raise price without the constraint of competition from existing
firms or from new entrants. Although easy to state, the market power
ratio of enforcement costs to the residual surplus falls too. If the residual surplus is large
relative to the consumer harm, the subsidy may become the optimal enforcement out-
come after a large change in the enforcement probability. These technical questions are
addressed in Hylton & Lin, supra note 4.
43 One factor is the type of test that is used to determine legality. If it is a rule of reason
type test, which is similar in form to a negligence test, the social desirability of multiplying
damages is ambiguous, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Princi-
ple and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999).
44 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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test inevitably involves a complicated assessment of facts and the exer-
cise of discretion, especially with respect to burdens of proof. In short,
market power is a legal construct that permits courts to exempt some
cases from penalization for a large set of reasons that may not be en-
tirely explicable in terms of short-term price-setting ability.
This model suggests that in the innovation antecedent to monopoliza-
tion setting, market power should be used more expansively as a screen
to exempt some firms from liability under the Sherman Act. In a case
where the residual surplus from market investment is large relative to
the consumer harm, the dynamic enforcement model implies that a sub-
sidy, rather than a fine, may be the socially desirable response from the
enforcement authority. Given the inability of courts to award subsidies,
the appropriate practical response from a court in such a case is immu-
nization through the market power test. This implies that in the innova-
tion antecedent to monopolization setting, where the residual surplus is
likely to be large relative to consumer harm, courts should demand
more of the evidence offered to prove the existence of market power,
and err on the side of the broader market definition with more
substitutes.
This argument can be approached in terms of the ratio of false con-
viction costs to false acquittal costs.45 The dynamic efficiency concern,
when taken into account, raises the ratio of the false conviction to the
false acquittal cost. This implies that the burden of proof that plaintiffs
have to meet on the monopoly power issue should be increased.
Consider, again, the artificial tooth hypothetical. In a monopolization
case, the first issue that would confront a court is whether to treat the
innovating firm as having monopoly power. Suppose the new artificial
tooth is superior to existing types. The court has a choice whether to
define the market as one based narrowly on the specific features of the
new artificial tooth, or on the general features of many varieties of artifi-
cial tooth. If it chooses the former definition, the defendant has a mar-
ket share of 90 percent; if the latter, the defendant’s market share is
only 10 percent. Choosing the latter (broad) market definition effec-
tively exempts the innovating firm from Section 2 liability. The dynamic
enforcement model suggests that where the residual surplus from inno-
45 We are referring to the error cost approach to antitrust. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying
Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2005); James C.
Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Prob-
lem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 639–64 (2005).
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vation is large relative to the consumer harm, a court should be biased
toward the broad market definition.
The lessons of this model can be used to examine the summary judg-
ment decision for the defendant, Del Monte, in a recent case involving
pineapples.46 After nearly a decade and a half of research and develop-
ment, Del Monte created a new variety of extra-sweet pineapple called
the MD-2.47 A monopolization class-action lawsuit was filed against Del
Monte for efforts that it took to discourage rival firms from producing
and marketing the same variety. In an analysis of the market power is-
sue, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ expert had excluded from the
relevant market other varieties of sweet pineapple, effectively treating
the MD-2 as a single market.48 The court reviewed the arguments of the
plaintiffs’ expert and granted summary judgment in favor of Del Monte.
The court’s opinion on the summary judgment motion is a careful ex-
amination of the plaintiffs’ expert’s arguments on the market power
question. However, the analysis at bottom is a judgment on the burden
and standard of proof. The submarket doctrine of Brown Shoe,49 analyzed
by the court, involves several discretionary decisions that a court has to
make on the sufficiency of evidence. The Del Monte court’s opinion
reduces to the simple statement that the plaintiffs did not bring enough
evidence on the question of market power.
Under the analysis of this article, a demanding proof standard on
market power is precisely what courts should apply in the innovation
antecedent to monopolization setting. Such an approach strikes the ap-
propriate balance from a decision theory perspective because it treats
false convictions as having a relatively high cost. Setting a high standard
of proof effectively creates a zone of safety from antitrust liability for the
firm that creates the very market it is accused of monopolizing.
The court noted that the evidence suggested that Del Monte had a
legitimate business justification for its conduct, and that Del Monte’s
efforts to discourage rivals did not appear to have had a significant ef-
fect in delaying their efforts to enter the MD-2 market. If these conclu-
sions are correct, then the pineapple dispute is best viewed as a case of
innovation without any real exclusion. A penalty applied to such a case
probably would do more to discourage innovation than monopolization,
because it would reward erroneous enforcement and frivolous litigation.
46 In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1628 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2009).
47 Id. at 6.
48 Id. at 10–22.
49 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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Assuming the residual surplus from innovation was substantial, Del
Monte would have received a subsidy, rather than a penalty, under the
dynamic enforcement model. A summary judgment is not the same as a
reward, but it is the best that an antitrust court can do in this setting.
E. MERGERS
A merger is another way in which a firm can enhance its power over
price. In a horizontal merger that results in a combined entity with mar-
ket power, the combined entity will increase its price above the competi-
tive level, resulting in short-run harm to consumers. In a vertical merger
that enables the acquiring firm to exclude competitors, the combined
entity will raise its price, with the same impact.
As a preliminary matter, one might argue that the innovation model
as described earlier in this paper is not applicable to the merger setting.
Mergers are often determined by several “big picture” factors and are
unlikely to be connected to the desire to secure a return on some spe-
cific product or service innovation. However, where the innovation is
sufficiently substantial to create a new market, the innovating firm
would have an incentive to consider how the long-term profits from in-
novation will be affected by the market’s structure. Merger, under these
conditions, would appear to be a plausible option for protecting or ap-
propriating the rents from innovation. The availability of the merger
option could then affect the incentive to invest in innovation.
Discussions of dynamic efficiencies in the merger context generally
focus on the prospect that innovation will generate new rivals to the
merging parties in the immediate future, dampening their ability to
hike prices after the merger.50 The merger of satellite radio firms XM
and Sirius was permitted by the U.S. Department of Justice on the basis
of this argument.51 When innovation can generate new competitors, dy-
namic competition provides a justification for choosing a broader,
rather than narrow market as the relevant market for analysis. However,
in the applications suggested by the dynamic enforcement model
presented here, the pricing power gained by a merger is viewed as hav-
ing ambiguous implications in the innovation setting. Consumers lose
surplus to the extent the post-merger price exceeds the competitive
level. But they gain surplus to the extent that anticipated post-merger
price increases support investment in innovation.
50 Sidak & Teece, supra note 4, at 623.
51 Id.
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The dynamic enforcement model implies that in the innovation ante-
cedent to merger setting, a relaxation of liability and regulatory prohibi-
tions might be socially desirable. To implement this suggestion, merger
enforcement authorities would have to distinguish antecedent innova-
tion mergers from other mergers involving no antecedent innovation.
Where the residual surplus to consumers is likely to be large relative to
the potential consumer harm, the merger enforcement authority should
err toward the broader market definition, as in the monopolization
analysis discussed above.52
Within a model, it is easy for courts to distinguish antecedent innova-
tion cases from others. In the real world, it would be difficult to separate
the two types. Every firm proposing a merger would attempt to charac-
terize it as an antecedent innovation case. Still, the objective evidence
should be sufficient to identify mergers that have substantial implica-
tions for innovation.
Consider FTC v. Staples53 from the perspective of this model. The
court had a choice between the broad market of office supply outlets
and the narrow market of office supply superstores. Within the broad
market, the proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot would
represent roughly 5 percent of office supply sales.54 Within the narrow
market, the combined entity would represent at least 45 percent of
sales.55 Staples had pioneered the high-volume office supply superstore.
Although the time between the initial innovation and the proposed
merger may appear to take this case outside of the innovation-antece-
dent-to-merger framework, the principles of this analysis still apply. We
are not arguing that a firm that has earned its expected return from
innovation within a reasonably long time period should still be permit-
ted to act in a manner that lessens competition in order to sustain a
high return. The problem, however, is uncertainty; when enforcers do
not know whether the firm has or has not earned its expected return,
they (as well as reviewing courts) should at least take into consideration
the investment implications of blocking a merger.
52 This is distinguishable from the argument for regulatory forbearance offered by
Sidak and Teece. Id. Their analysis of dynamic competition considers markets in which
potential rivals have the capacity to constrain the merging firms in the immediate future.
Our argument applies to the case in which no such potential competition exists.
53 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
54 To be precise, 5.5 percent in 1996. Id. at 1073.
55 The court referred to the twenty-seven metropolitan areas where the merger would
lead to a reduction from three office supply superstores to two. Within this set of geo-
graphic markets, the post-merger share of the combined entity would range from 45 per-
cent to 94 percent. Id. at 1081.
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Suppose the purpose of the merger was to enhance profitability
through lessening competition in the submarket of office supply super-
stores, as the FTC charged. The FTC’s policy, which prevented Staples
from using the acquisition to recapture profit levels that had been
eroded by entry into the submarket, discourages the very innovation
that created the office supply superstore market. Forward-looking firms,
realizing that merger as a cheap form of exit would be effectively pro-
hibited by the policy, would demand a higher rate of return in order to
develop a superstore submarket. If entry into the submarket is not diffi-
cult, the stream of future dynamic welfare gains forgone could easily be
greater than the stream of future static welfare losses.56
Admittedly, this example suggests virtually all mergers may use this
argument since virtually all of them involve some kind of innovation in
product or process. But the fact that the argument could be used by
nearly all mergers is not, by itself, a reason to reject it. The preferable
route would incorporate the innovation defense in a manner that en-
ables it to be used in the cases in which the costs of “false convictions”
(rejecting a socially desirable merger) are likely to be high and the costs
of “false acquittals” (permitting a socially undesirable merger) are low.
To avoid overly broad and exaggerated claims of innovation that agen-
cies are not well positioned to evaluate, the defense could be limited to
specific products and time periods.57
Plenty of industries have been characterized at times as needing con-
solidation because of weak profits. The argument for consolidation is
unpersuasive, on social welfare grounds, simply as a justification for
higher profits and nothing more. But the argument is typically based on
some feature of the industry that reflects a failure to efficiently meet
consumer preferences. For example, the relatively poor condition of the
banking sectors in the United States and in Germany has been attrib-
uted to market fragmentation, in addition to government support.58
56 The present value of dynamic efficiency gains would be determined by the residual
surplus component W (see Figure 1 supra). The present value of static costs would be
determined, in the short run, by the consumer harm T+D. As entry occurred and the
market became more competitive, the consumer harm would fall to zero and W would
expand by the amount of the original consumer harm.
57 Similarly, the dynamic story presented in this article could create difficulties in the
enforcement context when a firm attempts to constrain competition in a different prod-
uct than the one for which innovation investments are made. These difficulties suggest
that an innovation-based defense (e.g., as observed in Jerrold Electronics) might appropri-
ately be limited in scope to a single product for a limited time period.
58 The Sick Banking System of Europe, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009, at 77. The number of
credit institutions per 10,000 population is substantially higher in the United States and
in Germany than in other western countries. Id. This is distinguishable from the too big to
fail problem, which is more accurately viewed as a problem of political connectedness
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With little to lose in terms of a secure profit base, these banks invested
in the riskiest assets available (e.g., subprime mortgages). The U.S. air-
line industry regularly earns negative profits. In a consolidated airline
industry, firms would devote more resources to meeting consumer pref-
erences, including safety. Even Japan’s famously innovative mobile
phone industry has been described as suffering from excessive fragmen-
tation that limits the flow of resources to the most innovative and pro-
ductive firms.59
Unless all of the reports of excessive industrial fragmentation are to
be regarded as nonsense, antitrust policy should attempt to reconcile
itself with this set of facts. When profit serves as a signal for investment,
mergers for the sole purpose of gaining pricing power cannot be re-
garded as presumptively socially undesirable. If too much pricing power
is attained, entry will occur, pushing prices back down.60 The ordinary
process of entry and exit will regulate profits to a level sufficient to com-
pensate investments in market expanding products and services.
On a more general level, there is an open question about the fit be-
tween merger policy and general antitrust doctrine under Section 2.
Given monopolization law’s distinction between exploitation and exclu-
sion, the policy against mergers for market power seems difficult to ex-
plain. Mergers toward monopoly are efforts to exploit market power.
They sometimes include a risk of exclusion in the future, but it is by no
means clear that a merger should be prohibited simply because of a risk
that the merged entity may later exclude rivals. Let the law operate on
the merged entity at the moment it attempts to exclude a rival.
The possibility that a merger toward monopoly could result in exclu-
sionary acts in the future could, in theory, reduce the innovation incen-
tives of firms that compete against the merging firms. This argument is
based on two levels of prediction or conjecture: first that the merging
firm will exclude rivals after the merger, and second, that those rivals
would have invested in innovation if not for the threat of exclusion in
the future. If the innovation disincentive created by a merger is suffi-
within the largest U.S. banking institutions. See Lawrence J. White, Financial Regulation
and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust Community (June 9, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434454. Although the news coverage of banking failures has
focused on large banks, the U.S. banking industry is fragmented in comparison to most
other national markets. Most failures and regulatory shut-downs have involved banks that
are not in the “too big to fail” category.
59 No Exit: What Japan Needs Is More Bankruptcies, Not Fewer, ECONOMIST, June 20, 2009, at
16.
60 We have assumed that the pricing power created by such mergers does not result
from any restrictions on new entry. As long as there are no entry barriers, new firms can
erode the pricing power created by a merger.
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ciently large, the optimal enforcement policy, taking dynamic efficien-
cies into account, may tighten, rather than relax, regulatory constraints.
However, this argument is often weakened by its speculative nature and
the dearth of evidence supporting it. Moreover, it is difficult to distin-
guish rivals who object to a merger because they fear the effects of in-
creased future competition from rivals whose objections are based on
conjectural theories of exclusion. The arguments offered by the two
groups will often be based on the same set of facts. Conjectural theories
of exclusion and displaced innovation are relatively easy to state, and
difficult to prove or to disprove. In the absence of concrete evidence, a
position of skepticism toward conjectural theories of displaced innova-
tion seems warranted.61
F. CHANGING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The dynamic enforcement model directs us to examine (1) the ratio
of the residual surplus to the consumer harm and (2) the relative elastic-
ities of investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty. The
optimal dynamic penalty varies with these factors. The relationship be-
tween economic conditions and changes in the penalty, as implied in
this model, is an empirical matter.
As wealth declines, there is no unambiguously clear direction for the
ratio of the residual surplus to the consumer harm from supracompeti-
tive pricing. On one hand, consumers are likely to consider a wider
range of substitutes as wealth declines, which would cause demand
curves to become more elastic. With less pricing power the ratio of
residual surplus to consumer harm from supra-competitive pricing
probably increases. However, demand for some items may increase as
consumer wealth declines: cigarette sales expanded dramatically during
the Great Depression, increasing the pricing power of cigarette firms.62
In spite of the lack of an unambiguous answer that applies to every
market, the likely general result is that the residual surplus increases
relative to consumer harm during severe recessions. The Great Depres-
61 See generally William Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competi-
tion, 28 J.L. ECON. 247 (1985).
62 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND ECO-
NOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA 1929–1939 71 (1989) (“The cigarette division of the tobacco
industry fared well in the depression. After a slight drop in 1932, cigarette output in-
creased steadily.”). Bernstein cites contemporaneous studies of the tobacco industry. In
contrast to this account, Scherer, in the third edition of his textbook on industrial organi-
zation, argues that the profits earned by the cigarette companies were due to collusion in
a period of falling demand. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 250–51 (3d ed. 1990).
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sion was associated with a decline in prices, and recessions have gener-
ally been associated with deflation. Pricing power falls in bad economic
times. Given this, the general direction of the ratio of the residual sur-
plus to the consumer harm is likely to be up during recessions, even
though each component falls absolutely.
If the ratio of residual surplus to consumer harm is countercyclical,
then the instances in which a subsidy will be optimal, rather than a pen-
alty, will be greater during recessionary periods. In sectors in which
firms invest in creating or expanding markets, the optimal enforcement
model implies an expansion of safe harbors.63
The other factor to consider in the optimal enforcement approach is
the elasticities of innovation and monopolization with respect to the
penalty. As economic conditions worsen, will an increase in the penalty
have a greater impact on the incentive to set a supracompetitive price or
on the incentive to invest in market innovation? The incentive to set a
supracompetitive price is already weak in recessions. The payoff from
innovation is also weaker than in boom times. However, the alternative
opportunities to an innovator also decline during recessions. The incen-
tive to invest in innovation is likely to be relatively constant because both
the payoff and the opportunity cost of innovation decline during reces-
sions. If this is correct, the innovation incentive will be more responsive
than is the monopolization incentive to a change in the penalty during
recessions, and this implies a shift in the dynamic enforcement model
toward the subsidy.
The direction of policy during recessions is ultimately an empirical
question. The main contribution of a model such as this is to offer pre-
liminary answers and to direct the analysis toward a narrow set of issues.
G. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Our discussion of mergers can be applied to collusion. Does the dy-
namic enforcement model imply that collusion should be permitted
under the law?
The first thing to say about this is that the dynamic enforcement
model does not imply a blanket exemption to collusive practices. This is
a model of antitrust enforcement. Following the tradition of the litera-
63 Since some degree of cyclical variation in demand must be assumed at the innova-
tion stage, the downturns we are discussing should be assumed to be very serious reces-
sions that are outside of the parameters that people typically anticipate in business. For
recessions that are within the parameters typically anticipated, there is no clear innova-
tion-related reason to modify enforcement.
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ture on the economics of law enforcement, we have examined a model
in which the enforcement authority applies a monetary assessment to all
apprehended violators of the law. The novel feature in the dynamic en-
forcement model, in contrast to the static model, is that the assessment
may vary between a positive penalty and a subsidy.
It is not entirely obvious that the dynamic model applies to the case of
collusion. In the model we presented, one firm innovates and then seeks
to exclude rivals in order to secure a positive return on the innovation.
In the collusion setting this description would have to be modified. Sup-
pose one firm innovates and then seeks to get others to collude in order
to secure a positive return to the innovator. This is an implausible story
of collusion. The rational strategy on the part of the non-innovating
firms is to promise in the first period to collude during the second pe-
riod, in order to encourage innovation, and then cheat when the second
period arrives. Few instances of stable collusion would occur under this
description.
An alternative description of dynamic competition in the collusion
context would be a scenario in which all of the firms in an industry
innovate and then attempt to collude in order to secure a positive re-
turn on the innovation. Cheating might still occur, but the knowledge
that cheating erodes the incentive to invest might be a deterrent, espe-
cially in a repeat play setting. This is a plausible story of collusion and it
appears to fit with the dynamic enforcement model. Moreover, the
description is consistent with that of the airline industry, where negative
profits have arguably discouraged firms from making investments in new
technologies. This model may imply the social desirability of a safe har-
bor for collusion in the airline industry, and other industries suffering
under similar conditions. The safe harbor would be more productive if
applied during demand downturns.
However, creating safe harbors for collusion, although a possible im-
plication of the dynamic enforcement model, creates real-world difficul-
ties that the model as described does not address. One difficulty is the
probability of detection. In the monopolization applications discussed
previously, the probability of detection is high. In the collusion setting,
detection probabilities are low, precisely because firms that engage in
socially unproductive collusion (in contrast to the antecedent innova-
tion setting) will hide it from the public. Once a safe harbor is recog-
nized in the law, many firms may rush into collusion on the assumption
that if they are caught they can persuade courts or regulators that they
deserve to be within the safe harbor. This perception would reduce the
deterrent effect of enforcement. A workable alternative might be a bi-
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furcated system in which the general prohibition remains, but some
firms are permitted to openly petition for the right to collude.
Another real-world difficulty with collusion is that of political influ-
ence. Once a safe harbor is opened in the law for collusion, industries
will pressure legislators for a larger opening. The blanket prohibition,
though inconsistent with the dynamic enforcement model, may be pref-
erable in light of the rent-seeking costs that would be generated by a
safe harbor.
Although we have limited ourselves to incorporating the dynamic ef-
fect on the monopoly side, there is quite possibly a dynamic effect on
the side of the firms that are excluded by the monopolizing firm. A
monopolizing firm may reduce the incentive of rivals to innovate by ex-
cluding them from a substantial market. The FTC’s recent case against
Intel is based in part on the theory that Intel has discouraged innovation
by its competitors. Of course, one important distinction between the dy-
namic effects on the monopoly side and on the excluded-firm side is the
difference between seeing and believing. A monopoly that has gained its
status through innovation has demonstrated the link between its innova-
tion and the reward from monopoly status. A reduction in the reward is
likely to discourage future investment in the monopoly and in other
firms that promise a similar sort of expansion through innovation. On
the other hand, when rival firms complain that they would have inno-
vated if not for the exclusionary acts of a dominant firm, there is always
the question of validity lurking behind the claims. After all, plaintiffs
have strong financial incentives to assert such claims. For this reason,
claims that innovation would have taken place in some counterfactual
scenario should be discounted in the absence of strong evidence.
It is not difficult to modify the dynamic antitrust enforcement model
to incorporate the innovation effects on victims from exclusionary acts.
If such effects are included, they would appear in the model as external
costs that should be internalized to the monopolizing firm. But this
would not change the core implications of the model.
III. CONCLUSION
Crises and recessions are good times to rethink antitrust policy. But a
rethink is likely to bring out useful implications only if it deals with fun-
damental questions of policy. One fundamental question largely ig-
nored in the modern literature is that of dynamic competition—or the
static versus dynamic efficiency tradeoff in antitrust. When the dynamic
competition perspective is brought into the theory of optimal antitrust
enforcement, some substantial changes in enforcement policy recom-
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mendations emerge. These changes apply to all seasons and they have
implications for bad economic times too. The dynamic perspective im-
plies that investment and innovation incentives, viewed broadly, should
be taken into account in the assessment of liability under the Sherman
Act.
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APPENDIX:
SIMULATION OF DYNAMIC ENFORCEMENT
MODEL PENALTY
Here we set out some basic features of the model (whose results are
summarized in the text) and the simulation shown in Figure 2. Let P =
probability of apprehension. Let C = the cost to the state of appre-
hending the offender, C > 0; F = the fine imposed on apprehended of-
fender; M = the gross gain to the offender from committing an offense,
M > 0. M is governed by the probability distribution function H with
corresponding density function h . The offender will commit the offense
(monopolization) if M > PF ; therefore, the probability that the offender
does not commit an offense is H(PF). The monopolization offense oc-
curs with probability 1–H(PF) causing a loss of T+D ; enforcement oc-
curs with probability P; the offender is apprehended at cost C, and then
punished with a fine equal to F. The potential offender invests in the
first period, at cost ko. The potential offender will invest if the expected
return from monopolization, net of the penalty, exceeds his investment
cost. Let the investment cost ko be governed by the probability distribu-
tion Y with corresponding density y. The potential offender invests
when ko < k̄o = (1–H(PF))[E(MM > PF) – PF]. The probability of invest-
ment is therefore Y(k̄o).  The optimal antitrust penalty is64
T + D −WF = (1− q) ( ) + q ( ) + CP P
where the weighting parameter is65
y(k̄o )(1–H(PF))q = .
Y(k̄o)h(PF)+y(k̄o )(1–H(PF))2
If we assume H and Y are exponential functions with parameters lH
and lY respectively, then
64 The optimal penalty maximizes the sum of the gain from investment and consumer
surplus. See Hylton & Lin, supra note 4, at equation (2).
65 See id. at equation (5) (for derivation).
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To simulate the model, as shown in Figure 2, we used the following
parameter values: W=1, C=2, lH = 0.6, and lY = 0.8, P = 0.7.
